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CASENOTE
CRIMINAL LAW-Under the Minimization Requirement
of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, Recorded Wiretaps Will Not Be
Suppressed Unless an Objective Showing of
Unreasonable Procurement Is Made Without
Consideration of Surveilling Officers' Intent-Scott v.
United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 19681
enables the government 2 to intercept wire and oral communications3 in
order to obtain evidence when investigating particular crimes.4 The Act
requires that every order to intercept "shall be conducted in such a way as
to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to
interception under this chapter. . .. -" Known as the minimization re-
quirement, this clause imposes upon officers conducting the surveillance a
duty to cease intercepting calls which are extraneous to the investigation.
6
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 to 2520 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as Title III].
2. Under Title III the Attorney General may authorize an application to a federal
judge for an order approving the interception of wire or oral communications by the F.B.I.
or a federal agency investigating certain enumerated offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1976).
State officials are provided similar authority in the presence of a state statute. Id. at §
2516(2).
3. Intercept is defined by the Act as "aural acquisition of the contents of any wire or
oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device." Id. at
§ 2510(4). Wire communication includes telephone wiretaps. Id. at § 2510(1). Oral com-
munication encompasses those statements uttered by a person exhibiting a reasonable expec-
tation that such communication is not subject to interception. Id. at § 2510(2). Courts have
questioned whether the mere recording of a conversation without listening to it comes within
the meaning of the term "aural acquisition." At least one court has held that such conduct
is not covered by the statute. See United States v. Bynum, 360 F. Supp. 400, 408
(S.D.N.Y.), aj-d, 485 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974).
For purposes of this casenote, recording alone will be considered an aural acquisition.
4. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516(l)(a) through (g) (1976) for an enumeration of crimes covered
under the Act.
5. Id. at § 2518(5). The Act also provides that the judge may order reports on the
progress of the wiretaps to determine whether all safeguards, including the minimization
requirement, are being met. Id. at § 2518(6).
6. One commentator has defined minimization as "the process by which law enforce-
ment officials, under court supervision, attempt to limit interception and monitoring of calls
unrelated to the surveillance." Cranwell, Judicial Fine-Tuning of Electronic Surveillance, 6
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In incorporating the minimization requirement into Title III, Congress
strictly adhered to Supreme Court decisions interpreting the fourth
amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.7 Al-
though grounded in fourth amendment principles, the statutory require-
ment of minimization differs from fourth amendment protections in that it
mandates only the minimization, not the elimination, of impermissible in-
trusions.8 For a decade, lower courts construed Title III consistently with
Congress' intent to provide a constitutional basis for its wiretap statute.9
Those interpretations must now be reconsidered in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Scott v. United States.'0
On January 24, 1970, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia authorized a wiretap on defendants' telephone pursuant to Title
SETON HALL L. REV. 225, 251 (1975). See also United States v. Clerkley, 556 F.2d 709, 716
(4th Cir. 1977) ("the wiretap statute [18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 to 2520 (1976)] merely provides that
unnecessary intrusions be minimized, or reduced to the smallest degree possible"); United
States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143, 156 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Hacket v. United
States, 429 U.S. 837 (1976) (minimization is the effort to reduce interceptions of innocent
conversations "to a practical minimum while allowing the legitimate aims of the government
to be pursued").
7. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41
(1967). See also notes 36-42 and accompanying text infra. The fourth amendment pro-
vides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. As applied to wiretapping, the fourth amendment requires a judi-
cially authorized warrant, based upon probable cause, describing with particularity the con-
versations to be seized. See also 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3), (4) (1976).
8. Differences between traditional fourth amendment analysis and minimization anal-
ysis are examined in Comment, Post-Authorization Problems in the Use of Wiretaps.- Minimi-
zation, Amendment, Sealing, and Inventories, 61 CORNELL L.Q. 92, 102 (1975). Violation of
fourth amendment protections typically requires exclusion of evidence illegally obtained.
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914), overruled on other grounds, Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
9. "[Tlhe Court delineated the constitutional criteria that electronic surveillance legis-
lation should contain. Title III was drafted to meet these standards. . . ." S. REP. No.
1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2153
[hereinafter cited as 1968 SENATE REPORT]. See generally United States v. Kirk, 534 F.2d
1262, 1273 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 907 (1977) ("Title III fully meets the consti-
tutional requirements of the Fourth Amendment."); United States v. Fino, 478 F.2d 35, 36
(2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974) (no constitutional defects in Title III as
applied in this circuit); United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522, 530 (4th Cir. 1972), aft'd,
416 U.S. 505 (1974) (recognized congressional intent that constitutional standards govern
Title III wiretaps); United States v. Escandar, 319 F. Supp. 295, 304 (S.D. Fla. 1970), rev'don
other grounds sub nom. United States v. Robinson, 468 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1972) (court notes
legislative history of Title III in finding the wiretap statute constitutional on its face and as
applied).
10. 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
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III.1 The order required that the wiretap be conducted in accordance
with the minimization requirement and that reports be made to the issuing
judge every five days. 12 Information obtained through the wiretap re-
sulted in the indictment of several persons for conspiracy to sell narco-
tics. a The agents conducting the surveillance intercepted every call in its
entirety, made or received over the tapped telephone line. 14 Defendants
moved to suppress all the evidence acquired through the wiretap, alleging
the government's failure to minimize according to the order. The district
court granted defendants' motion and ordered all the recorded evidence
suppressed. Central to its decision were the facts that all conversations
were recorded and that sixty percent of them were neither related to nar-
cotics nor otherwise subject to interception.' 5 Examining the agents' re-
ports to the issuing judge, the court concluded that the judge was not
informed of the failure to minimize, but only provided with the number of
calls recorded each day and the number which related to narcotics.16
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
vacated the suppression order and remanded the case.' 7 Applying the
standards set down in an intervening case, United States v. James,18 it or-
11. United States v. Scott, 331 F. Supp. 233, 237 (D.D.C. 1971), Pacated and remanded,
504 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
12. The order required the wiretap to be conducted in "such a way as to minimize the
interception of communications that are otherwise subject to interception." Scott v. United
States, 436 U.S. at 132. Noting that the order should have read "not otherwise subject", the
Court was nonetheless satisfied that the agents conducting the surveillance understood its
intent. Id. at 132 n.3.
13. United States v. Scott, 331 F. Supp. at 241. The government originally believed
that the scope of the conspiracy, ultimately found to be local to the Washington, D.C. area,
involved efforts to smuggle narcotics into the United States.
14. In all, 384 conversations were intercepted. United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751, 754
(D.C. Cir. 1975), rehearing en bane denied, 522 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 917 (1976). Language in the Supreme Court's decision states that "virtually all the
conversations were intercepted." 436 U.S. at 132. The only time the agents disconnected
their equipment was when they had mistakenly been connected to a wrong number. Re-
sponding to the district court's question as to whether that was the only time minimization
was considered, the agent in charge of the investigation replied, "[t]hat is correct .... " 436
U.S. at 133 n.7.
15. United States v. Scott, 331 F. Supp. at 247-48. The court rejected a government
argument that the possibility of defendants' use of codes justified the total interception, say-
ing "[difficulty in determining possible codes] cannot authorize indiscriminate listening or
permit such agents to totally disregard an order [for minimization]."
16. Id. at 248.
17. United States v. Scott, 504 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
18. 494 F.2d 1007 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Tantillo v. United States, 419 U.S.
1020 (1974). In addition to identifying four factors by which to judge the degree of minimi-
zation required (see notes 43-45 and accompanying text infra), the James court adopted a
more subjective test. The minimization requirement, the court stated, is satisfied "if 'on the
whole the agents have shown a high regard for the right of privacy and have done all they
1978]
Catholic University Law Review
dered the district court to assess the reasonableness of the agents' actions in
light of the purpose of the wiretap and the information available to the
agents at the time of the intercept. On remand, the district court sup-
pressed the recordings a second time, on the ground that the agents' pur-
poseful failure to minimize was unreasonable. 19
The court of appeals again reversed, this time reviewing the intercepted
conversations rather than remanding the case.20 Applying the James crite-
ria, the court weighed the government's expectations, the use of the phone,
and the degree of judicial supervision and found no violation of the mini-
mization requirement.2' Dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc,
Judge Robinson declared that the court's decision was at odds with James.
Foreseeing a "temptation to wiretap first and then use the fruits of the
interception in an effort to demonstrate that the intrusion was justified"
22
Judge Robinson feared that the majority's decision would fatally damage
the minimization requirement.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on an appeal of the defendants'
subsequent conviction and upheld the earlier decision of the court of ap-
peals. 23 In an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the majority rejected petition-
ers' argument that a "good faith effort" to comply with the minimization
requirement was mandated by general fourth amendment principles.24 In-
stead, the Court adopted an objective standard whereby agents' actions,
reasonably could to avoid unnecessary intrusion.'" 494 F.2d at 1018 (quoting United States
v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 784 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973)).
19. See United States v. Scott, No. 1088-70 (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 1974), reversed and
remanded, 516 F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir.), rehearing en banc denied, 522 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 917 (1976) (cited in 425 U.S. at 920 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
The district court maintained that because the order for minimization was not met, the evi-
dence must be suppressed even if every intercepted call was related to narcotics.
20. United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir.), rehearing en banc denied, 522 F.2d
1333 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 917 (1976).
21. The circuit court in Scott held that the intense surveillance was justified when: 1)
there were no predeterminations of the scope of the criminal activity; 2) forty percent of the
calls received on a private phone, normally requiring greater privacy, were "business" re-
lated; 3) the government expected a larger conspiracy than found; and 4) the judge was
aware of the high percentage of unrelated calls. 516 F.2d at 758-59. The court then postu-
lated that even if agents should openly declare their intention to violate the minimization
requirement, subsequent interceptions would not necessarily be suppressed. Instead, the
court ruled that such evidence would be evaluated for a determination of the reasonableness
of its procurement. Id. at 756.
22. United States v. Scott, 522 F.2d 1333, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
917 (1976).
23. After initially denying certiorari, Scott v. United States, 425 U.S. 917 (1976), the
Court agreed to hear the case after the defendants were convicted and the decision. was
affirmed by the court of appeals. See Scott v. United States, 551 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
ajf'd, 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
24. 436 U.S. at 135-37.
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instead of their intentions, became the relevant criteria for judging compli-
ance with the minimization requirement.25 Similarly, the Court rejected
petitioners' argument that the statute required a good faith effort at mini-
mization. The statutory language, reasoned the Court, applies only to ac-
tual physical conduct, not subjective intent.26 Finally, the Court evaluated
the physical conduct of the agents by examining the calls, and found that
they were reasonably intercepted. 27 Dissenting, Justice Brennan accused
the Court of dangerously undermining congressional and constitutional
protections against abuses in surveillance.
28
In considering Scott v. United States, the Supreme Court handed down
its first interpretation of the Title III minimization requirement. The
Court's decision, however, substantially departs from approaches to mini-
mization taken in the majority of lower court jurisdictions.
I. THE MINIMIZATION REQUIREMENT: CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS
ON GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE
The eavesdropping provisions incorporated by Congress into Title III
evolved from three major Supreme Court decisions. In Osborn v. United
States,29 the Court approved the use of a recording device concealed on a
government informer on the ground that prior federal judicial authoriza-
tion had been obtained "for the narrow and particularized purpose of as-
certaining the truth of the . . . [informer's] allegations. ' 30 Osborn
established the requirements for obtaining the issuance of a wiretap: a war-
rant, issued by a magistrate, evidencing antecedent justification for the
eavesdropping, and particularity of purpose.31 The Osborn warrant and
particularity requirements were further detailed in Berger v. New York.
32
In Berger, the Court struck down a New York eavesdropping statute for its
failure to meet the Osborn standards, and enumerated the specific safe-
guards which the law should have required. As articulated in Berger, the
eavesdropping order must describe the conversations sought with particu-
25. The Court conceded in a footnote that subjective motivation may be pertinent after
a statutory or constitutional violation has been established. Id. at 139 n.13.
26. This emphasis on objectivity supports the court of appeals statement that agents
could publicly declare their intent to disobey the minimization order, yet still conduct lawful
interceptions. See United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d at 756.
27. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. at 141-43.
28. Justice Brennan referred to the Court's decision as a "myopic, incremental denigra-
tion of Title III's safeguards..." and suggested that the statute may now be vulnerable to
constitutional challenge on fourth amendment grounds. Id. at 148.
29. 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
30. Id. at 330.
31. The Court also suggested a third requirement by approving eavesdropping only
under "precise and discriminate circumstances." Id. at 329-30.
32. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
1978]
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larity, state the government's objectives in "entering a constitutionally pro-
tected area," and set limits upon the conduct of the executing officers. 33 In
this manner, Berger outlined the acceptable procedures for government
eavesdropping.
The following term, in Katz v. United States,34 the Court declared an
F.B.I. eavesdrop unconstitutional for lack of a judicially authorized war-
rant, even though the surveillance was so carefully conducted that it could
have been constitutionally approved in advance by a magistrate.35 The
Court, citing Osborn, found prior judicial authorization to be an essential
requirement under the fourth amendment. 36 In Katz, the government
complied with the spirit of the other Osborn and Berger safeguards by
limiting its surveillance to the defendant's use of a public telephone, by
restricting its investigation to the contents of defendant's unlawful conver-
sations, and by ceasing its surveillance of another user's accidentally inter-
cepted conversations. Nevertheless, these efforts could not remedy the
failure to obtain a warrant. Under the Katz and Berger decisions, both of
which applied the earlier Osborn standards, the Court required compli-
ance with specifically enumerated safeguards and the issuance of a warrant
before the eavesdropping would be constitutionally permissible. These
holdings comprised the nucleus around which Congress constructed the
wiretapping provisions of Title III.
As enacted, Title III reflects congressional intent that the Berger and
Katz standards prevail in the area of government eavesdropping. 37 Ac-
cordingly, it represents a congressional balancing, within Supreme Court
guidelines, of stringent crime control measures and the need for protec-
tions from unlimited governmental surveillance power.38 Its legislative
33. Id. at 57. The Court also invalidated provisions permitting a two-month surveil-
lance on a single showing of probable cause or extensions beyond two months without addi-
tional showings of probable cause, and required a judicially imposed termination once the
sought conversation was seized. Id. at 59.
34. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
35. The Court notes approvingly that the agents did not begin electronic surveillance
until there was a "strong possibility" that federal law was being violated, limited the surveil-
lance to establishing the illegal contents of defendant's telephone calls, intercepted only
when defendant was using the public phone booth, and "took great care" to record only
defendant's calls. Id. at 354.
36. Id. at 359 n.24.
37. 1968 SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 75.
38. As stated by Justice Brennan:
Congress has explicitly informed us that the "minimization" and companion safe-
guards were designed to assure that "the order will link up specific person, specific
offense, and specific place. Together [the provisions of Title III] are intended to
meet the test of the Constitution that electronic surveillance techniques be used
only under the most precise and discriminate circumstances which fully comply
with the requirement of particularity."
[Vol. 28:143
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history, however, fails to address the question of what constitutes minimi-
zation,39 thereby forcing lower courts to interpret the requirement without
substantial guidance. As a result, various lines of analysis have devel-
oped.
One line of minimization analysis, formulated by the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia in United States v. James,40 has been widely
followed. In James, the defendants were convicted on evidence obtained
from telephone wiretaps, during which government agents intercepted
every call made on the lines. The court evaluated the scope of the crimi-
nal enterprise, the location of the tapped phones, the government's reason-
able expectations, and the presence of appropriate judicial supervision
during the interceptions.4' Resolving these four factors in the govern-
ment's favor, the court affirmed the defendants' convictions.
42
The James criteria have been applied by numerous courts ruling on
challenges to the minimization procedure.43 For example, in the recent
case of United States v. Clerkley,44 defendants were convicted of gambling
violations on evidence obtained from a wiretap and a monitoring device
planted in a room. Applying James, the court found that a suspected
widespread conspiracy, coupled with insufficient knowledge preventing the
government from shaping a minimization effort, justified the intensive
government eavesdropping activities under Title 11I.
4 5
A second approach 46 used by courts to determine compliance with the
Bynum v. United States, 423 U.S. 952, 952 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari, quoting 1968 SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 102).
39. See generally 1968 SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 103. In its only reference to
minimization, the report merely paraphrases the wording of the Act.
40. 494 F.2d 1007 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1020 (1974).
41. Id. at 1019-21. Compare note 21 supra.
42. 494 F.2d at 1021-22. Noting that the defendants were "involved in a narcotics con-
spiracy of great size and sophistication," that the government was aware of this conspiracy
when surveillance was begun, that defendants' telephones were found to be used "almost
exclusively to conduct illegal business," that their apartment deserved a lesser standard of
privacy than an ordinary home because it served no residential purpose, and that the super-
vising judge was informed of and approved the government's conduct, the court determined
that the wiretap was valid. Id.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Kirk, 534 F.2d 1262, 1275-76 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
433 U.S. 907 (1977); United States v. Armocida, 515 F.2d 29, 42-46 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 858 (1975); United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d 867, 873-75 (7th Cir. 1975).
44. 556 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1977).
45. In addition, reports were made every five days to the magistrate. Id. at 718.
46. A potential third method of analysis, presented in State v. Dye, 60 N.J. 518, 291
A.2d 825, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1090 (1972), has been generally disfavored. The warrant in
Dye had authorized interception of all calls made during specified hours without regard to
their content. 291 A.2d at 828. Known as extrinsic minimization, the method is rarely
used, since time of day is unlikely to be a precise method of segregating innocent from
criminal communications. Justice Douglas, dissenting from the denial of certiorari, called
19781
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minimization requirement comprises an analysis of the facts on an ad hoc
basis. Under this approach, an agent's good faith effort to minimize ap-
pears to be a crucial factor in determining reasonableness. For example,
in United States v. Tortorello,47 the court noted that agents had considered
the caller's identity, the timbre of the speaker's voice, the "guarded nature"
of the conversations, and whether children were on the line in determining
when to intercept. Once the agents decided that a call was not pertinent to
the criminal investigation, interception ceased. Reasoning that "the
agents [had] shown a high regard for the right of privacy and [had] done
all they reasonably could to avoid unnecessary intrusions," the Tortorello
court declared the minimization effort acceptable. 48 A similar approach
was taken in United States v. Falcone,49 in which the government wiretaps
were initiated to obtain evidence of narcotics distribution. The court
noted that because one-half of all defendant's innocent calls, 50 some highly
personal, had not been monitored, the agents' conduct amounted to a
"good faith, reasonable effort to minimize . . 1
While not involving judicial scrutiny or compliance with the minimiza-
tion requirement, the Supreme Court in United States v. Kahn reinforced
the need for minimization in wiretapping. 52 Kahn specifically addressed
the use of wiretapped evidence against persons for whom probable cause
did not exist and who were not named in the warrant. A warrant had
total surveillance during limited periods of time "the equivalent of a general warrant." 409
U.S. at 1093. The federal courts use an intrinsic minimization standard, which permits
around the clock surveillance, but requires a determination of whether each separate call
should be intercepted. See generally Comment, supra note 8, at 119-21.
47. 480 F.2d 764, 783 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973).
48. 480 F.2d at 783-84. The Tortorello court relied on three cases to support its stan-
dard of high regard for privacy and its mandate that all reasonable action be taken to avoid
unnecessary interceptions. See United States v. Scott, 331 F. Supp. 233, 247-48 (D.D.C.
1971), vacated, 504 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (violation of minimization found where all
calls intercepted and no minimization effort made); United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523,
540-43 (S.D. Cal. 1971), modoed, 473 F.2d 494 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 920 (1973)
(violation of the minimization requirement where approximately 85% of calls intercepted
were irrelevant); United States v. Sklaroff, 323 F. Supp. 296, 316-17 (S.D. Fla. 1971) (no
violation of minimization when over 10% of personal calls and numerous privileged crime-
related calls were either not recorded or only partially recorded).
49. 364 F. Supp. 877 (D.N.J. 1973), affid, 500 F.2d 1401 (3d Cir. 1974).
50. Every court considering minimization agrees that some interception of innocent
calls is permissible. See, e.g., United States v. Schwartz, 535 F.2d 160, 164 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 906 (1977); United States v. Fino, 478 F.2d 35, 38 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974).
51. United States v. Falcone, 364 F. Supp. at 886-88. For other decisions which have
relied on the agents' good faith to test minimization efforts, see United States v. Manfredi,
488 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1974); United States v. Fino, 478
F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918 (1974).
52. 415 U.S. 143 (1974).
[Vol. 28:143
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been issued authorizing the wiretapping of the suspect's phone to obtain
evidence of gambling against him "and others as yet unknown." 53 The
suspect's wife was convicted on evidence obtained in part from calls in
which the suspect was not a participant. The majority upheld that convic-
tion, construing the warrant to include anyone conversing on the tapped
line.54 Although the Court recognized that its decision might encourage
agents to intercept without regard to parties named in the warrant, it con-
sidered the minimization requirement, as well as the specificity of the war-
rant and the time limits on the interception, to be adequate safeguards.55
Thus, Kahn allows the government a significant measure of discretion in
the use of wiretap evidence but relies upon the minimization requirement
to safeguard individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. In
light of the potential for abuse in such a broad warrant, 56 protection of a
party's fourth amendment rights depends upon rigorous enforcement of
the minimization requirement. In this sense the Kahn Court reaffirmed
the need, as reflected in lower court interpretations of the minimization
requirement, to balance protection of both the defendants' and innocent
parties' constitutional rights against the need for reasonable, good faith
efforts by the government to investigate crime and enforce the laws.
II. SCOTT V. UNITED STATES. JUDICIAL RESCISSION OF MINIMIZATION
PROTECTIONS
The Supreme Court's decision in Scott v. United States may substan-
tially affect this balance between the government's law enforcement effort
and the protection of citizens' constitutional rights provided under Title
III. In focusing upon the agent's actions during surveillance as a key fac-
tor in determining compliance with the minimization requirement, the
Court relied on traditional fourth amendment search and seizure analysis,
which begins with an objective assessment of an officer's actions.57 To
53. Id. at 146-47. The defendant's wife had argued that she did not fall within the
scope of "others as yet unknown" because the agents conducting the surveillance had reagon
to believe that she was involved in the gambling operation. She contended that since she
was under suspicion, the government should have named her in the warrant. The Court did
not accept her argument, on the grounds that there had been no probable cause that she was
committing any offense. Id. at 151-55.
54. The dissent argued that the phrase referred solely to any persons who were convers-
ing with Kahn. Id. at 160 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 154.
56. Justice Douglas deplored the result in Kahn, saying "a wiretap warrant apparently
need specify but one name and a national dragnet becomes operative." Id. at 163 (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
57. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. at 137. To support its conclusion that fourth amend-
ment analysis begins with objective assessments, the Court relied on United States v. Robin-
son, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (police officer need not indicate subjective fear that suspect is
19781
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illustrate, the majority cited Terry v. Ohio,"s in which the Court held that a
limited stop and frisk to ensure the security of a police officer did not vio-
late the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches. In
reaching this determination, the Terry Court "objectively" viewed the
challenged conduct in light of the facts available to the officer. 59 Applying
this objective analysis to wiretaps, the Court in Scott concluded that the
minimization standard merely required a post hoc evaluation of the rela-
tive reasonableness of the officers' actions, without consideration of the
subjective intent of the officers involved. 60 This was accomplished by an
examination of the individual calls, each of which the Court found to have
been reasonably intercepted. In focusing on the circumstances surround-
armed to validate search incident to a lawful arrest); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964)
(fourth amendment requires suppression of evidence obtained after arrest and search based
solely on suspicion which would not have warranted a reasonably prudent person to con-
clude suspect had committed or was committing a crime); and Henry v. United States, 361
U.S. 98, 102 (1959) (probable cause to arrest exists only if the facts and circumstances known
to the officer warrant a prudent person in believing an offense is being or has been commit-
ted).
58. 392 U.S. 1, 21-24 (1968). In Terry, defendants were stopped and frisked without a
warrant, after having been observed passing the same store window two dozen times, staring
inside, and conferring on an adjacent comer. The police officer's frisk revealed bulges in
the clothing of two defendants, from which the officer removed guns. The Court found this
intrusion, although based on reasonable suspicion rather than the probable cause tradition-
ally required under fourth amendment principles, justified by the unreasonable risk of vio-
lence facing a police officer on the street.
59. It should be noted here that the objective-subjective distinction in fourth amend-
ment analysis is prone to some confusion. An objective assessment of an officer's actions
includes subjective elements. For example, in weighing the reasonableness of the search
and seizure in the light of the "particular circumstances," the Court in Terry considered as
one factor the reactions and suspicions of an officer with thirty years of experience on the
beat. Id. at 24. The Scott court also includes subjective elements in its objective analysis.
For example, the Court is unwilling to consider subjective intent in assessing the reasonable-
ness of the minimization effort, yet will consider the experience of an agent when examining
the possibility of widespread conspiracy. Thus, as used by the Scott Court, "objective"
appears to mean in light of the particular circumstances of the case, including consideration
of an agent's experience; "subjective" embraces good faith or bad faith motivations, insofar
as they are related to the minimization effort.
60. The Court's action substantially departs from the bulk of prior minimization law in
that courts may no longer consider the surveilling officers' subjective intent, ie., bad faith,
when weighing the minimization effort. Cf. United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973) (court weighed agents' regard for the right of privacy
in evaluating the minimization effort); and United States v. Falcone, 364 F. Supp. 877 (D.
N.J. 1973), aI'd, 500 F.2d 1401 (3d Cir. 1974) (court scrutinized agents' conduct to deter-
mine whether a good faith reasonable effort to minimize had been made). The application
of the Court's objective standard emphasizes the objective-subjective dichotomy. The Court
may accordingly consider arguably subjective factors, such as the experience of the agents,
when engaging in purely objective analysis of minimization procedure. Conversely, the
Court eliminates as subjective any consideration of the agents' intezit, motivation or good
faith. See note 59 supra.
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ing the calls, the Court exempted several categories of calls from minimi-
zation. Nonpertinent short calls were excused because a "determination of
relevancy cannot be made before the call is completed."'61 One-time only
calls were similarly excused since they "did not give the agents an opportu-
nity to develop a category of innocent calls .... *62 Additionally, the
Court eliminated ambiguous calls or those involving guarded or coded
language. 63 Finally, the Court recognized an exemption for investigative
situations predicated upon the existence of a widespread conspiracy,
thereby upholding the need for extensive surveillance to determine the
conspiracy's scope.64 In this manner, the Court satisfied itself that the in-
terception of every call, and therefore the conduct of the surveilling of-
ficers, was reasonable.
This analysis can be criticized for a number of reasons. First, in finding
all interceptions reasonable, the Court may have weakened the minimiza-
tion requirement by permitting the interception of calls that could not logi-
cally be justified by the circumstances at issue. For example, the Court
excused numerous interceptions of calls made to a ninety-second recorded
telephone company weather message, because "even a seasoned listener
would have been hard pressed to determine with any precision the rele-
vancy of many of the calls before they were completed. ' 65 Furthermore,
the Court included as reasonable six calls which the government itself had
characterized as "unrelated to the narcotics enterprise and. . . intercepted
with no reasonable expectation of related material. '66 This reluctance to
find a violation of the minimization requirement in Scott diminishes the
possibility that violations will be found in subsequent cases. By further
creating overbroad categories of immune calls, the majority opinion pro-
vides the government with sufficient leeway to meet the requirement. On
the basis of the number and scope of the exceptions to minimization item-
61. United States v. Scott, 436 U.S. at 141.
62. Id. at 142. Despite the ambiguity of the classification "one-time only," no defini-
tion was provided.
63. These categories, in addition to being broad and undefined, may permit the govern-
ment to claim the possiblity of codes as justification for nearly any interception. It has been
suggested that an officer should be able to tell a coded conversation from an innocent one,
yet the Court does not take this fact into consideration. See Note, Minimization of Wire
Interception: Presearch, Guidelines and Postsearch Remedies, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1411, 1419
n.42 (1974).
64. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. at 142-43.
65. Id. at 141-42. While it may seem that no privacy interest is violated by such inter-
ceptions, it should be noted that the statute requires minimization of all communications
extraneous to the investigation, not merely those in which a privacy interest can be found.
See note 6 supra. Twenty-seven calls consisting totally of this type of recorded message were
intercepted in their entirety. United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d at 754 n.3.
66. Id.
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ized in Scott, it is difficult to imagine how any violation of the minimiza-
tion requirement could be committed.
67
Second, the use of traditional search and seizure analysis is not entirely
appropriate in wiretapping situations, since an officer conducting a wiretap
is in no physical jeopardy, and is actually not searching or seizing, but
searching and seizing simultaneously. 68 Once the officer has overheard a
conversation, that conversation can never be returned. While electronic
surveillance may arguably deserve a higher standard of protection,69 the
Court nonetheless ignores this distinction in Scott.
Moreover, precluding consideration of the intercepting officers' subjec-
tive intent during surveillance will produce some predictable conse-
quences. Such an objective standard, involving substantial amounts of
hindsight, may over-emphasize the importance of the government's call
analysis and thus tip the outcome in favor of the government. Call analy-
ses, similar to the one prepared in Scott, are essentially breakdowns of the
intercepted calls, classified according to the subject matter of the conversa-
tions. In Scott, the call analysis contained categories that were labelled
"communications so ambiguous that their purpose cannot be determined,"
"communications not concerned with the narcotics enterprise but nonethe-
less of important evidentiary value," and "communications which are un-
related to the narcotics enterprise but which were intercepted with a
reasonable expectation of related material."' 70 While there may be some
need for broad categories, the use of vague classifications such as those in
Scott enables the government to forego explanations for particular inter-
ceptions and concentrate instead on justifying the categories of calls at is-
sue. The strictly objective examination mandated by Scott also precludes
67. The decision provides one example. Where the tapped phone is public, and agents
intercept every call regardless of the person placing it, the Court would "substantially
doubt" whether minimization was proper. 436 U.S. at 140.
68. See Comment, supra note 8, at 102:
Both search and seizure must be minimized-search, because it must be limited to
a search for seizable items, and seizure, because it must be limited to the items in
the warrant. This result is not easily transferred to the wiretap context; for it is
surely not obvious which parts of the surveillance process correspond to a search
and which parts to a seizure.
69. A higher standard would arguably be justified in view of the magnitude of rights at
stake. In Dye v. New Jersey, 409 U.S. 1090 (1972), Justice Douglas, dissenting from denial
of certiorari wrote: "Few threats to liberty exist which are greater than those posed by the
use of eavesdropping devices." Id. at 1091 (quoting Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63
(1967)).
70. The call analysis is reproduced at 516 F.2d at 754 n.3. The trial court had referred
to it as "an after-the-fact non-validated presentation of counsel for the Government."
United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d at 754. In United States v. Bynum, 360 F. Supp. 400, 417
(S.D.N.Y.), affd, 485 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1973), vacatedon other grounds, 417 U.S. 903 (1974),
the court described defendants' preparation of a similar table as "result oriented" and based
on a "wisdom born of hindsight."
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any defense attempt to impeach the call-analysis by scrutinizing the of-
ficers' subjective intent. In a difficult, complex or ambiguous case, the
intent of the officer could be decisive in determining whether any attempt
to minimize had, in fact, been made.71 Thus some court consideration of
the agents' subjective intent seems essential to ensure greater respect for
and protection of the important privacy rights at stake.
Although Scott rules out subjective intent as a factor in applying the
minimization requirement, the decision acknowledges that an official's
motives may play some part in determining what remedy is appropriate
after a statutory or constitutional violation has been found.72 Prior to
Scott, lower courts had postulated several variations of the exclusionary
rule as remedies for a failure to minimize. 73 The district court in Scott
suggested that a violation of the minimization requirement should result in
the total suppression of the recorded evidence at trial.74 An alternate sug-
gestion is the suppression of only those interceptions illegally obtained.
Since the illegally obtained conversations, for minimization purposes, are
unrelated to criminal activities, partial suppression has been criticized as
being no real deterrent to government failure to minimize.75 Finally, a
combination of the two has been suggested that would permit partial sup-
pression only on a finding that agents made a good faith and reasonable,
albeit flawed, effort at minimization.76 By noting that an agent's motives
may be a factor in determining whether suppression is appropriate, the
Court has failed to settle the diverse lower court interpretations and has
put the practical application of the minimization requirement in jeopardy.
For example, the remedy of partial suppression enables a court to exclude
only "innocent" calls while admitting those calls which incriminate the
defendant. In practice, this would be similar to giving the government li-
cense to intercept without minimizing, since the innocent calls would be
71. If, for example, surveilling agents prior to intercepting were to declare their inten-
tion to monitor every call placed on the line and then claim the possibility of codes as justifi-
cation, that declaration might be determinative if considered. If many of the allegedly
coded calls were ambiguous, a court might well decide to suppress on the basis of the prior
statement.
72. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 135-36. The Court did not address the question of
remedies because, after reviewing the intercepted conversations, it found no violation of the
minimization requirement.
73. See generally Note, supra note 63, at 1435 n.l 16; Comment, supra note 8, at 124-25.
74. 331 F. Supp. at 248. See also United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033 (D. Md.),
aff'd sub nom. United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972), aft'd, 416 U.S. 505
(1974).
75. See United States v. Sisca, 361 F. Supp. 735, 746-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), a 'd, 503 F.2d
1337 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1008 (1974).
76. See United States v. Lanza, 349 F. Supp. 929, 932-33 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
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weeded out at a pretrial hearing.77 In the absence of an appropriate rem-
edy for a violation of Title III, the government may now decide to forego
efforts to minimize in hopes of a court decision favoring partial suppres-
sion.
Scott also casts doubt on the practicality of other Title III provisions.
The Act provides for a cause of action against any person who illegally
acquires wire or oral communications. 78 The Court's reluctance to find a
minimization violation in the light of the actions related in Scott suggests
that only patently indefensible surveillance procedures will be barred. As-
suming the government can avoid such procedures, the provision for civil
remedies may be rendered useless.79 The Scott decision may have also
damaged the requirement for judicial supervision. Title III provides an
issuing magistrate with broad discretionary powers, including the author-
ity to order that periodic reports be made to him at regular intervals con-
cerning the progress of the wiretap.80 In Scott, the reports to the issuing
judge indicated the number of calls recorded each day and the number of
those which related to narcotics. 8' The judge could not, from the reports,
determine the presence or lack of efforts at minimization.82 Despite this
lack of complete and accurate reporting to the issuing judge, the Court did
not mention the issue of judicial supervision in its opinion. In this way,
Scott undercuts the importance of judicial supervision by sanctioning in-
adequate reports by the government and incomplete scrutiny of those re-
ports by the issuing magistrate.
77. In United States v. Focarile, the court stated:
[Tihe minization requirement of § 2518(5) would be illusory if it were enforced on
an item-by-item basis by means of suppressing unauthorized seizures at trial after
the interception is afai accompli. Minimization as required by the statute must be
employed by the law enforcement officers during the wiretap, not by the court after
the wiretap.
340 F. Supp. 1033, 1046-47 (D. Md. 1972) (emphasis in original).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1976).
79. Had the Court found a violation of the minimization requirement in Scott, the de-
fendants might have had a cause of action against the government for damages of $100.00
for each day of the illegal surveillance, or $1,000.00, whichever is greater, plus punitive
damages, attorneys' fees and costs. Id. at § 2520(2)(a) to (c). Even prior to Scott, however,
the possibility of recovery was marginal, since the government's good faith reliance on the
court order constitutes a complete defense. Id. at § 2520. After Scott, the provision may be
completely ineffective, in view of the Court's reluctance to find a minimization violation in
the first place.
81. 331 F. Supp. at 248.
82. In contrast the court of appeals conceded that the judge was not informed of the
failure to minimize and ordered that periodic reports in the future refer to minimization
efforts. The court held, however, that the degree of judicial supervision was reasonable




Furthermore, the weakened minimization requirement articulated in
Scott arguably undermines important Supreme Court precedent. In
United States v. Kahn,83 the Court emphasized that effective enforcement
of the minimization requirement is essential to prevent the blanket ap-
proval of a general wiretapping warrant. Without such enforcement,
agents can intercept broadly, hoping the recordings may prove incriminat-
ing to a third party and become self-justifying.
III. CONCLUSION
Relying on Scott v. United States, a court may now judge compliance
with the minimization requirement of Title III by a post hoc objective
analysis of agents' actions. No consideration of the agents' intention to
comply need be made. In applying traditional but inapposite fourth
amendment search and seizure analysis to the area of electronic surveil-
lance, Scott significantly weakens the constitutional protections Congress
sought to embody in Title III.
As a practical matter, agents conducting electronic surveillance may
now legally intercept one-hundred percent of the calls placed on a tapped
line, provided they can fit the intercepted calls into one of Scott's over-
broad, judicially immune categories. Additionally, although agents may
have no intention of honoring the requirements of the statute or a judge's
order to minimize, Scott indicates that such motivations cannot in any way
be a basis for invoking the exclusionary rule. Moreover, the decision indi-
cates that agents may circumvent the maintenance of judicial supervision
by its failure to insist upon complete and accurate reports to the issuing
judge. Finally, even if a defendant could prove a violation of the minimi-
zation requirement after Scott, the Court leaves open the question of an
appropriate remedy. The result could be widespread abuse of the right to
privacy despite exacting congressional efforts to the contrary. Given these
implications, a dilution of the Katz and Berger standards appears likely.
As a result, further legislative guidance is essential in order to reestablish
safeguards no longer guaranteed by the debilitated minimization process.
For these reasons it has become necessary for Congress to reassert the con-
stitutional protections of Katz and Berger in a clear and explicit rewording
of the minimization requirement.
Christopher Jon Bellotto
83. 415 U.S. 143, 154-55 (1974).
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